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Abstract
Entrepreneurs strongly a↵ect firm outcomes. We use deaths of several hundred
entrepreneurs as a source of exogenous variation, and find large and sustained e↵ects
of entrepreneurs at all levels of the firm performance distribution. Entrepreneurs
strongly a↵ect performance of both very young firms and more mature firms, and
across the firm size distribution. The results appear stronger in ‘dynamic’ indus-
tries with higher education level, larger R&D expenses and higher sales growth.
The e↵ects appear to be driven by entrepreneur specialness rather than leadership
transition; the e↵ects of death of entrepreneur-managers is economically and sta-
tistically stronger than the death of managers that are not entrepreneurs. Overall,
entrepreneurs play a large and unique role not previously empirically documented.
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1 Introduction
In the large literature on firm performance, spanning corporate finance, industrial eco-
nomics and parts of labor economics, economists have paid little attention to entrepreneurs.
The idea of entrepreneurs as movers and shakers is old (Schumpeter, 1934), but geographi-
cal, institutional, and industry characteristics (Syverson, 2011), managers and managerial
practices (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003, Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007), and financial
conditions (Guiso et al., 2004) have been the focus of empirical work. One objective of
the paper is to ask how much individual entrepreneurs contribute to the performance of
firms.
Little is known whether entrepreneurs have much of an e↵ect. In addition to informing
our understanding of firm outcomes, this question relates to an old debate stemming from
Coase (1937) over what constitutes a firm and keeps it together. We study whether the
entrepreneurs constitutes the core of the firm, and for how long. We also study whether
entrepreneur are special compared to managers. We contribute to the debate on the
foundation of the firm, which arguably lies at the root of economics, and also to which
factors contribute to the performance of nascent and young firms.
We use an extraordinarily large, representative, dataset. To study the influence of
entrepreneurs, we examine firms where the entrepreneur dies. In these firms, the en-
trepreneur’s engagement was random, determined by the timing of the entrepreneur’s
death rather than underlying economic conditions. These deaths therefore provide an
opportunity to quantify whether entrepreneurs have a causal e↵ect on firm performance.1
We analyze the impact of entrepreneur death on firm survival, growth, and profitabil-
ity. For example, we compare survivorship rates of firms where the entrepreneur dies
1Several recent papers use death as an exogenous event to study causal e↵ects, for example Azoulay
et al. (2010) on the spillover e↵ects of research superstars, Jones and Olken (2005) on the influence of
national leaders for economic growth, Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) on the value of independent directors
at company boards, Bennedsen et al. (2007) on the value of CEOs, and Andersen and Nielsen (2012) on
the e↵ect of windfall gains through inheritance on entrepreneurial activity.
2
with survivorship rates of firms where the entrepreneur does not die. We interpret di↵er-
ences in survivorship rates between these two groups of firms as evidence for the personal
importance of the entrepreneur.
Alternatively, a lack of di↵erence between these two groups would provide evidence of
the non-importance of the entrepreneur; once the firm has been formed the entrepreneur
can vanish without harming the firm. Imagine a small restaurant. The entrepreneur de-
cides which corner to locate on, the menu, and which individuals to hire. After these major
initial decisions have been made, the entrepreneur may not play a large, irreplaceable,
role anymore, and the firm may be equally well led by other individuals.
In order to estimate the e↵ect of entrepreneur death, we make two kinds of com-
parisons. We compare the performance of firms where the entrepreneur dies to the
performance of firms where the entrepreneur does not die. This allows us to compare
entrepreneur death to the counterfactual where the entrepreneur stays alive. We also
compare the e↵ect on the firm of entrepreneur death relative to the e↵ect of other shocks,
such as a key worker dying. This allows us to compare entrepreneur death to the coun-
terfactual where the firm experiences other shocks.
We employ a large and unique database that contains longitudinal accounting and
employment information on the universe of incorporated firms established in Norway be-
tween 1999 and 2007. Covering the population of new firms means that the vast majority
of firms in the database are small. Although most of these firms are not that interest-
ing individually, they are collectively. There is an analogue to labor economics: each
individual is not that interesting but we care about workers in general.
We focus on firms that employ at least one person at the end of the first year of
operations. For each firm, the data identify the initial owners. We define an entrepreneur
as an individual that owns more than 50 percent of the shares initially. The database
contains 16,127 firms started up by such individuals, with at least one employee in the
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year of foundation, and 205 firms where such majority owners die before the end of 2010.
In separate analyses, we also look at 50 percent owners and at minority stake owners.
We track firm performance with accounting data submitted yearly to the tax authorities.
The accounting data runs until 2012, thus firms in the database are between zero and
thirteen years old.
We ask whether entrepreneurs have a causal e↵ect on firm performance. In order to
accommodate that entrepreneurs that die within the sample period are older on average
(and, as a consequence, wealthier) than entrepreneurs that do not, for each of the firms
where the entrepreneur dies (’treated’ firms) we use propensity score matching to identify
a similar firm (’matched control’ firm), restricted to be started up in the same calendar
year. The matched control firms have similar characteristics at startup date, but do not
experience subsequent entrepreneur death. We run di↵erence-in-di↵erences regressions,
comparing the performance of treated firms and matched control firms before and after
entrepreneur death. In a separate set of regressions, we utilize all firms in the database
(i.e., do not use matching) and obtain very similar results. To accommodate time-invariant
firm characteristics, we include firm fixed e↵ects in both type of regressions.
The empirical analysis provides robust evidence that firm performance drops after
the entrepreneur’s death. Entrepreneur death leads to a reduction in firm survival com-
pared to the control group. The e↵ects are large; conditional on the firm being active
the year before entrepreneur death, the treatment e↵ect on survival is about 25 percent.
Entrepreneur death leads to a stark reduction in sales and smaller but significant ef-
fect on employment. We expected the group of firms that experienced the death of the
entrepreneur to have a dip in performance immediately after the death owing to the up-
heaval, but anticipated there would be a bounce back. However, even four or five years
after the death, the treated group of firms shows no sign of recovering relative to the
control group and the negative e↵ect on performance appears to continue even further
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beyond that.
The results on sales and employment are partly driven by firms closing down; a firm
that has closed down would have zero sales and zero employees. Importantly, quantile
regressions suggests large negative e↵ects of entrepreneur death also for firms that do not
go out of business; the results are strong at all quantiles from the 50th to the 90th.
The majority of firms in the database are small, and it would not be surprising that
miniature firms, consisting of the founder himself and perhaps an employee or two, close
down if the founder dies. We show that the e↵ects are strong up to the fourth quintile of
the firm size distribution (firms with 5-8 employees the year before founder death). For
the top quintile we do not find treatment e↵ects, which could be because of the large
heterogeneity of firms in this category. This shows that our results are not driven by
miniature firms closing down after the founder dies.
One would expect entrepreneurs to matter more in sectors of the economy that are
more reliant on human capital relative to physical capital. The results suggest that this
is indeed the case; the negative e↵ects of entrepreneur death are larger in sectors with
more highly educated entrepreneurs, and in sectors with larger R&D expenses and higher
sales growth.
The results we are picking up may not be due to entrepreneur specialness, but detri-
mental e↵ects of abrupt leadership transition in young firms. Indeed, it is possible for
founders and successors to be of identical ability and yet to find an e↵ect of founder death
because it is costly for the firm to adapt to a new leader. In order to deal with this ques-
tion, we employ data that provides the identity of the firm’s chief executive o cer (CEO)
between 2002 and 2007. We split the CEOs into two groups: founders and non-founders,
and compare the causal e↵ect of CEOs that are founders with the casusal e↵ect of CEOs
that are not founders. We find that the e↵ects of death of founder CEOs are economically
and statistically much stronger than for CEOs that are not founders. We also investigate
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whether ’lesser’ shocks have a greater impact with CEO-founders, by analyzing the e↵ect
on firm performance of death in the nucleous family of the CEO. Again the negative
e↵ects are larger for CEO-founders than for CEOs that are not founders. We conclude
that our results appear driven by the specialness of the entrepreneur and not leadership
transition of young firms.
One would expect that firms become less reliant on the entrepreneur as they mature.
Johnson et al. (1985) examine the e↵ect on share price of senior management deaths
for a sample of 53 U.S. publicly traded firms. The e↵ect of CEO death on share price is
negative for the sample overall, but positive for the death of CEOs that were also founders
of the company, a finding verified with more recent data by Pe´rez-Gonza´lez (2006). We
analyze whether the magnitude of the drop in firm performance depends upon firm age
at entrepreneur death. We find large e↵ects of founder death for firms that are up to
seven years old when the founder dies, and weaker e↵ects for firms that have exceeded
this threshold.
We interpret our estimates as capturing the causal e↵ect of the entrepreneur. An
alternative explanation could be reverse causality: poor firm performance leads to the
entrepreneur having a higher probability of dying. This could come in two forms. First,
firms experiencing founder death might be weaker at birth because illness (or expectation
of illness) of the founder leads the founder to start small. We do not really expect this
to be the case given the undoubted strains of starting up a business, which might make
firm foundation more of an ‘all or nothing’ choice. Indeed, we show that treated and
control firms do not di↵er in their year zero employment and equity, suggesting that key
observable indicators of firm size do not di↵er between the two groups. Second, firms
experiencing founder death might start to perform poorly after foundation but before
founder death. We do not find evidence of pre-treatment di↵erences in firm performance.
These diagnostic tests suggest that reverse causality is not a major concern.mk,k,,kk
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We believe our paper is the first to identify that entrepreneurs have a large e↵ect
on startup performance. Part of the explanation for the strong e↵ects could be that
after the entrepreneur has died, the control of the firm is transfered to less competent
family members (Perez-Gonzales, 2006, Bennedsen et al., 2007, and Bertrand et al., 2008
document negative e↵ects on performance from family CEO appointments inside mature
firms). To deal with this question, we examine whether entrepreneur death a↵ects family
firms (defined as a firm where another family member is a co-owner initially) di↵erently
than non-family firms. Although the sample of family firms is not large (less than 6%),
it appears that family firms are more resilient to the loss of the entrepreneur than non
family firms. It does not appear, therefore, that value destruction by family members can
explain the results.
Firms that experience entrepreneur death have much lower survival rates in the years
after the death event.2 Perhaps heirs voluntarily close down firms that were largely
motivated by providing private rather than economic benefits for the dead entrepreneur.
To examine this question we analyze bankruptcies. The bankruptcy code in Norway is
similar to Chapter 7 in the U.S. bankruptcy code, i.e., bankruptcy is associated with
creditors taking control, and very unlikely to be ’voluntary’ (as in Chapter 11 in the
U.S bankruptcy code). We find that firms where the entrepreneur dies have twice the
probability of going bankrupt. Thus there is little to support the notion that voluntary
close-downs by heirs is driving the results.
The paper connects to several strands of literature. First, economists have shown that
large and persistent di↵erences in productivity across firms exist even after taking into
account geographical, industry and firm age di↵erences (see the surveys by Bartelsman and
Doms, 2000 and Syverson, 2011). Much less is known about the importance of individuals.
We point out that a factor missing in this literature – individual entrepreneurs and their
2A firm is not active if it (a) has gone bankrupt, (b) closed down for other reasons, (c) has less than
NOK 50,000 (ca. 6,500 Euros) in sales. So, bankruptcy is just one reason for non-survival.
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engagement – can explain some of the heterogeneity for young firms.
Second, a growing literature demonstrates that professional managers and manage-
ment practices can lead to improved outcomes for mature firms.3 Bennedsen et al. (2007)
show that within-family succession of chief executive o cers (CEOs) harm firm perfor-
mance relative to employing a manager from outside the family. Bennedsen et al. (2010)
finds that the average operating returns on assets decreases by about 1 percentage point
in a four-year window around CEO death. Bennedsen et al. (2012) find that CEO hospi-
talization leads to firm under-performance. For example, long hospital stays (more than
30 days within a year) implies about 1 percentage point drop in operating returns on
assets of the firm. Our findings complement this literature by showing that for young
firms, entrepreneurs play a large role. In addition, we show that entrepreneur-managers
play a much larger role than non-entrepreneur managers.
Third, much work on entrepreneurship focuses on the antecedents of entrepreneurship
(Evans and Jovanovic, 1979, Hurst and Lusardi, 2004, Kerr and Nanda, 2009) and the
risk-return trade-o↵ of the entry decision (Hamilton, 2000, Vereshchagina and Hopenhayn,
2009, Hall and Woodward, 2010). Less is known about which factors a↵ect outcomes.
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994), Hvide and Moen (2011) and Andersen and Nielsen (2012)
analyze the role of financial constraints. Lerner and Malmendier (2014) finds that learning
about other individuals’ entrepreneurial experiences decreases entry rates but improves
performance, and Hvide and Panos (2014) finds that entrepreneurial risk aversion has a
similar e↵ect. We complement this literature by being the first to directly measure the
impact of entrepreneurs, and to demonstrate that the impact is large.4
3Bertrand and Schoar (2003) documents di↵erences in management styles between individuals, and
find evidence consistent with CEOs of publicly listed companies a↵ecting firm performance. Bloom and
Van Reenen (2007) and Bloom et al., (2011) document that higher-quality management practices are
correlated with several measures of productivity and firm performance in a sample of non-listed firms.
They do not focus on the role of individual managers, but their results are consistent with individual
managers playing a large role through a↵ecting management practices. Kaplan et al., (2012) show that
CEO characteristics matter for firm performance.
4Kaplan et al. (2009) study strategy and management changes in a sample of 156 fast-growing
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Fourth, governments try to boost competitiveness through a vast array of policies,
many with the objective to reduce credit constraints among young firms. If entrepreneurs
personally embed a major part of the value of the firm, it will be di cult to pledge
the value of the firms to outside investors, which leads to lack of financing and under-
investment in entrepreneurial firms, as in Hart and Moore (1994). The extent to which
entrepreneurs are non-substitutable is a largely unexplored question. We show that en-
trepreneurs personally do embed a major part of the value of the firm, and for surprisingly
long.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses why en-
trepreneurs should matter in light of existing theory and evidence. Section III presents
the data and descriptive statistics. Section IV discusses the empirical strategy. Section
V presents the main results and specification checks, while Section VI explores mecha-
nisms. Section VII analyzes leadership transition (CEO death). Section VIII interprets
the results and concludes.
2 Why should entrepreneurs matter?
Standard theoretical models tend to take a neoclassical view of the firm in which en-
trepreneurs are homogeneous inputs in the production process, and substitutable once a
firm has been founded. For example, in Kihlstrom and La↵ont (1979), the entrepreneur
bears residual risk but does not contribute to firm performance. In sorting models
(e.g., Lucas, 1978, Evans and Jovanovic, 1989, Lazear, 2005), individuals with high en-
companies that eventually go public. Between receiving venture funding and the initial public o↵ering,
almost none of these companies change their line of business, while the management team changes quite
frequently. Thus, for this sample of companies, the idea seemed more stable than the management team.
One takeaway from the present paper is that individuals are more important for newly established firms
than the results from Kaplan et al. (2009) would suggest. Glaeser et al. (2015) use mines as an instrument
for entrepreneurship and find a persistent link between entrepreneurship and city employment growth.
We use random variation created by death and find evidence suggesting that entrepreneurs have a large
and sustained impact on their firms.
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trepreneurial ability become entrepreneurs, while individuals with low entrepreneurial
ability become workers. Although sorting models, or variations of such, are consistent
with individual entrepreneurs being important to firm performance, a degree of smooth-
ness in the distribution of entrepreneurial ability will tend to rule out individuals playing
a large role. Of course, the neoclassical view does not exclude the possibility that there
are transitional costs, such as search costs or turbulence costs, from replacing the en-
trepreneur.5
One theoretical tradition that justifies non-substitutability is critical resource theory
(Wernerfelt, 1984, and Rajan and Zingales, 1998, 2001), where a firm is a set of specific
investments built around a critical resource or resources. In the current context, the
entrepreneur’s human capital, personality, and ideas can be seen as the critical resource
which the firm is initially organized around (this is a sense in which the entrepreneur
shapes the production function of the firm). The entrepreneur then invests in physical
and human assets that are complementary to himself, and may not be fully substitutable
because other individuals lack his combination of traits. Under this view, the entrepreneur
can have two e↵ects on firm performance. The first is the direct e↵ect through own
productivity, and the second, which works via providing the critical asset, is positive
spillover e↵ects on the other assets of the firm. We find very large negative e↵ects on
sales after entrepreneur death but smaller negative e↵ects on firm employment, consistent
with spillovers from the entrepreneur to the productivity of the firm’s employees.
Critical resource theory says less about for how long the entrepreneur is essential. One
reason to be concerned about this question is that the duration of non-substitutability
influences how long firms are financially constrained and subject to underinvestment.
Critical resource theory also says less about which activities make entrepreneurs impor-
5Other theories of entrepreneurship such as Hellmann (2007) and Hvide (2009) emphasize how con-
tractual frictions in established firms can induce entrepreneurship. These theories can explain produc-
tivity di↵erences between entrepreneurs, but not why entrepreneurs become non-substitutable.
10
tant. Leadership in mature firms is divided between managers and owners, where man-
agers take care of daily operations and owners oversee managers and provide strategic
direction. Entrepreneurs in young firms tends to be engaged in both processes and our
empirical strategy allows us to study which role is more important.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 Norway
We start with a brief description of the Norwegian economy, the tax code, and the basis
for the data collection.6 Norway is an industrialized nation with a population of about 4.7
million. The GDP per capita in 2008 was about $58,717 when currencies are converted
at purchasing power parity; this is higher than the EU average of $30,651. Norway is
characterized by a large middle class, and a low inequality of disposable income. For
labor income, the maximum marginal tax rate (for incomes above $75,000) is about 50%,
which is fairly typical by European standards. The capital income tax is a flat 28% on
net capital gains.
Similar to other industrialized countries, setting up an incorporated company in Nor-
way carries tax benefits relative to being self-employed (e.g., more beneficial write-o↵s
for expenses such as home o ce, company car, and computer equipment), and incorpora-
tion status will therefore be more tax-e cient than self-employment status except for the
smallest projects. The formal capital requirement for registering an incorporated limited
liability company was NOK 50,000 in equity until 1998 and NOK 100,000 thereafter (in
2008, $1 was equal to about 7 NOK).
In contrast to most OECD countries, Norwegian households are subject to a wealth
6The material is taken from the OECD Statistical Profile for Norway: 2010, available at OECD.org,
and from Statistics Norway webpages.
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tax every year throughout their lives.7 The government’s statistical agency, Statistics
Norway (also known by its Norwegian acronym SSB) collects yearly data on wealth and
income at the individual level from the Norwegian Tax Agency, and we obtain our data
from Statistics Norway. Earnings and wealth figures for individuals are public information
in Norway. This transparency is generally believed to make tax evasion more di cult and
hence data more reliable.
The tax value of a firm, which is included in its owners’ wealth statements, is calculated
as sixty percent of assets subtracted debt, where debt is evaluated at face value while assets
are at book value (typically lower than market value). Selling o↵ a non-listed company
therefore produces a tax liability if, which one can expect to commonly be the case, the
transaction price exceeds the tax value of the company. This liability can be evaded by
transferring the company to a holding company before selling o↵. We therefore do not
expect the capital gains tax to bias the individuals that inherit a non-listed company
towards keeping it or selling it o↵. In Norway there is also tax on inheritance. The
inheritance tax on a non-listed company is based on the tax value of the firm on January
1 in the year of death. This means that the inheritance tax is e↵ectively sunk once
inheritance has taken place. We have therefore no reason to believe that the inheritance
tax will bias the results.8
7In contrast, the U.S. tax system requires wealth reporting only in connection with estate tax, which
is imposed only on the very rich at the time of death (Campbell, 2006). The wealth tax in Norway is 0%
up to about $120,000 in net wealth, and about 1% for net wealth above $120,000.
8If a spouse inherits, no inheritance tax will be paid until the spouse dies or remarries. If children
of the entrepreneur inherit, in the period we study there was a 20% inheritance tax on inheritances
whose tax value exceeded NOK 550.000, 8% rate on inheritances between 250.000 and 550.000 and 0%
below 250.000 (for unrelated beneficiaries, the rates were slightly higher). For example, if the firm has
NOK 2.1 million in assets and NOK 1 million in debt, the tax value is NOK 1.1 million. If two children
inherit, they receive NOK 550.000 each, and are taxed 8% on NOK 300.000, i.e., they pay NOK 24.000 in
inheritance tax each. (NOK 24,000 is equivalent to about 3,200 Euro.) This is unlikely to be a challenge
for most Norwegian households, so we do not expect liquidity constraints to be important, in contrast
to in Tsoutsoura (2015). The approximate median tax value of the firms in our sample is NOK 71.000,
the 75 percentile is NOK 154,000, and the 90 percentile is NOK 355.000. In 2008, $1 was equal to about
NOK 7.
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3.2 Data
We construct a database that consists of the universe of incorporated, limited liability,
firms in Norway between 1999 and 2007, where one individual holds at least 50 percent of
the initial shares.9 The data include yearly detailed accounting and employment measures
for each firm until the end of 2012, so that the firms in the database are between zero
and thirteen years old. Covering the population of new firms means that the majority of
firms in the database are small. In the analysis, we therefore confine attention to firms
that have at least one employee (which may be the entrepreneur himself) in the first year
of operations. Further, to avoid counting wealth management vehicles as start-ups, we
eliminate finance and real estate firms (NACE 65-70). The inclusion of these firms gives
similar results. The median book value of assets and number of employees in the first
year of operations is about $160,000 and three, respectively.
Comparing our dataset with recent datasets used in the productivity literature, Foster
et al. (2008) analyze the universe of manufacturing plants in the U.S. over a 20-year
period. The firms are split into four age categories [age bracket in parentheses]: entrants
[0,5], young [5,10], medium [10,15] and old [15 and older]. Thus our data cover more than
two of the four firm age brackets considered by Foster et al. (2008). Compared to datasets
of the productivity literature, a main novelty is that the data contain ownership shares in
the incorporation year, broken down by each owner with at least a ten percent ownership
share. We have a detailed panel on socio-demographic information on all owners, including
year of death if applicable, ranging from 1993 to 2009.
9For 1999, the data contain only a sample of the firms started. Diagnostic tests do not suggest any
selection bias. We eliminated firms where the founder died after 2010 because we want to have at least
two years of post-death information for any firm in our analysis. We also drop firms where the founder
was older than 67, i.e. beyond retirement age, when founding the firm. Our results do not weaken if we
include these firms.
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The data are compiled from three di↵erent registers:
1. Accounting information from Dun & Bradstreet’s database of accounting figures
based on the annual financial statements submitted to the tax authorities. This
data include variables such as 5-digit industry code, sales, assets, number of em-
ployees, and profits for the years 1999-2011. Note that the D&B data contain yearly
information on all Norwegian incorporated limited liability companies, and not a
sample as in the U.S. equivalent. Incorporated companies are required to have an
external auditor certifying the accounting statements in the annual reports.
2. Data on individuals from 1993 to 2010 prepared by Statistics Norway. These records
are based on government register data and tax statements, and include the anonymized
personal identification number and yearly socio-demographic variables such as gen-
der, age, education in years, taxable wealth, and income. The data identify the
year of death, if applicable, and also identifies family relationships between indi-
viduals, which allows us to identify family firms. The data contain all Norwegian
individuals, not a sample as in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics or the Survey
of Consumer Finance. As with the PSID and the SCF, the data are anonymized
(contains no names of individuals).
3. Founding documents submitted by new firms to the government agency ’Brønnoysund-
registeret’. This register data include the start-up year, total capitalization, and the
personal identification number and ownership share of all initial owners with at least
10 percent ownership stake.
For each new firm identified in 1), we create a list of owners identified through 3)
and compile their associated socio-demographic information from 2). We define an en-
trepreneur as a person with more than 50 percent ownership of the total shares in a
newly established limited liability firm. We interchangeably refer to this person as ’the
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entrepreneur’ or ’the founder’. Restricting the sample to majority owners ensures that
we are likely to include ’real’ entrepreneurs in our sample. (In separate analysis below,
we also look at owners with less than, and equal to, 50 percent ownership share.) For a
small fraction of firms, the first year of financial reporting, defined through 1), is di↵erent
than the year of incorporation defined by 3). For these firms, we define the first year as
the first year of reporting.10
3.3 Descriptives of original sample
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the firms and founders in the sample. Founder
characteristics generally refer to the first year of operations, with the exception of log
wealth and log earnings which are taken as the log of five-year averages prior to firm
foundation. Firm characteristics refer to time of incorporation. Table 1 contrasts char-
acteristics of ’treated’ firms (i.e., where the founders die during our sample period) with
’control’ firms (i.e., where the founders do not die during the sample period). In the
initial sample of 16,127 firms, 205 experience founder death during our sampling period.11
Founders who die are older and, likely as a consequence, wealthier and less educated. The
sectoral composition is very similar. The only small di↵erences are that firms where the
founder dies are more likely to be in transportation, and less likely to be in other services.
This might reflect the fact that the ’treated’ founders are less educated and therefore
more prone to be in more traditional industries.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Table 2 shows the timing of entry and the timing of death for the treated firms. Firms
10A large literature focuses on the self-employed (e.g., Hurst and Lusardi, 2004). By studying incor-
porations, we can meaningfully distinguish between the life-span of the entrepreneur and the life-span of
the firm; our empirical strategy would be impossible with data on the self-employed.
11About one-half of the firms in our database have an individual with at least 50% initial ownership.
The remaining firms are either started up by a team of individuals or (more frequently) by a firm. The
latter category is likely to be spin-o↵s of divisions of established firms, rather than start-ups proper. This
is also reflected in the size distribution of these firms.
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where the founder dies enter in all years between 1999 and 2007 inclusive. Founders of
these firms die in all years between 2001 and 2010 inclusive.12 Another useful descriptive
is firm age at founder death. Founder death occurs at any firm age, from year 1 through
year 11 (the maximum firm age possible given our sample). In our analysis, amongst
others, we will look into the question of whether founder death has di↵erent implications
for younger versus older firms.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
4 Empirical strategy
4.1 Estimation sample
It is natural not to compare the 205 firms with founder death to all 15,922 firms without
founder death, but to limit the analysis to those firms (and their founders) in the control
group who are most comparable in terms of their observable characteristics. We use
propensity score matching to select the firms in the control group who are most similar to
the firms in the treatment group. More specifically, we use nearest neighbor matching to
select those firms in the control group whose ex ante probability of experiencing founder
death is closest to that of the 205 firms where the founder dies.13 Our further analysis
then proceeds on this matched sample. For comparison, we also perform the analysis
using OLS on all 16,127 firms in our database. Those results are presented in Table A.1.
The propensity score is the probability of treatment (i.e., founder death) conditional
on pre-treatment characteristics. The idea of propensity score matching is to match
treated and controls whose ex ante probability of receiving treatment (i.e., to experience
12Remember that we deliberately excluded observations where the founder dies after 2010 because we
have no data for their firms after the year of death, so we cannot identify e↵ects of founder death on firm
survival and firm performance for them.
13In unreported analysis, we use two-nearest neighbor matching and obtain very similar results.
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founder death) – as predicted by their pre-treatment characteristics – is ‘identical’ (see
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). By ‘pre-treatment characteristics’ we mean characteristics
at firm foundation, i.e., the variables shown in Table 1. Characteristics measured at a
later point, e.g., in the year before founder death, might already be subject to endogeneity
bias because of the foreshadowing of (later) founder death.
To estimate the propensity score, we run a probit model of founder death on the
characteristics from Table 1. The results are reported in Table A.2. We obtain estimated
propensity scores for all 205 ‘treated’ founders and for 15,922 controls.14 Ex ante, the
treated make up just above 1 percent of our sample. Based on the estimated propensity
score, we use nearest-neighbor matching (without replacement) to combine treated and
control observations.15 We impose a caliper (i.e., radius) of 0.05, i.e., treated firms that
have no comparison unit whose estimated propensity score is within 0.05 of their own
estimated propensity score are discarded to avoid bad matches. Imposing this caliper,
it turns out, we lose no treated founders whatsoever.16 Importantly, we impose exact
matching on the year the firm starts activities. This is to make sure that we are comparing
pairs of treated and control firms that are of the same age in the same calendar year.
In line with the di↵erences detected in Table 1 between treatment and control group,
the pre-treatment characteristics have substantial explanatory power in predicting founder
death. Table A.2 shows that the pseudo-R2 is 0.11. The variables entering the propensity
score estimation are jointly significant at the 1%-level. Another indicator of di↵erences
between treatment and control group before matching is the so-called median absolute
standardized bias, defined by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) as the comparison between
14Some control units are automatically dropped in the propensity score estimation because they have
predicted probabilities of zero, i.e. their characteristics perfectly predict non-treatment.
15We use a version of Edwin Leuven and Barbara Sianesi’s Stata module psmatch2 (2010, version 4.0.4,
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html) to perform propensity-score matching and covariate
balance testing.
16While imposing a caliper is inessential in our case, we follow common practice to impose it in the
first place.
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(standardized) means of treated and control units, where the standardized di↵erences
(standardized biases) between the means for a covariate xi are defined as:
Bbefore(xi) = 100 · x¯i1   x¯i0q
1
2(V1(xi) + V0(xi))
where x¯i1 denotes the treated unit mean and x¯i0 the control unit mean for covariate xi
and where V1(xi) and V0(xi) are the sample variances in the treated group and control
group, respectively. The median absolute standardized bias before matching is 16.95.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest that a value of 20 is ’large’, i.e., in line with the
other two indicators above, treated and control groups do di↵er considerably ex ante.
On the basis of the estimated propensity score, for each treated firm we search for the
control whose propensity score is closest to that of the treated firm (‘nearest neighbor
matching’). All control firms that do not qualify as a nearest neighbor are discarded from
the further analysis.
Matching gives us a better control group and reduces the bias in comparing treated
and control groups to the extent that it manages to largely remove the pre-treatment
di↵erences between the treatment and control group. We can formally test this, using the
same three indicators of imbalance between the treatment and control group, but now
using the matched sample. To do so, we re-run the same propensity score specification on
the matched sample, i.e., on the sample of treated and matched controls. After match-
ing, the pseudo-R2 drops to 0.02 (from the 0.11 reported in Table A.2). Similarly, the
variables entering the propensity score are no longer jointly significant, with a p-value
of 0.995. The median absolute standardized bias drops from 16.95 before matching to
3.85 after matching.17 Matching thus appears to be very successful at reducing (or even
17The median absolute standardized bias after matching is defined as
Bafter(xi) = 100 · x¯i1M   x¯i0Mq
1
2 (V1(xi) + V0(xi))
,
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removing) di↵erences in observable pre-treatment characteristics. In other words, our
matched sample consists of firms where the founder dies and a set of ‘twin firms’ who are
ex ante observationally identical, but where the founder does not die. We consider the
matched control group as a useful comparison group that approximates the counterfactual
outcome of the treated firms.
4.2 Di↵erence-in-di↵erences setup
We ask whether individual entrepreneurs have a causal e↵ect on firm performance. To
answer this question, we examine whether firms where the founder dies perform di↵erently
from firms where the founder does not die. We are mainly interested in di↵erences after
founder death. However, we also look into performance di↵erences before founder death.
Di↵erences in performance before founder death would indicate a deterioration in the
condition of the founder and his firm before his death. As we will show, there are no
di↵erences between treated and control firms before founder death, which is consistent
with two possible explanations. Either founder death comes as a surprise, in which case
it is natural not to detect any pre-death di↵erences in performance; alternatively, even
if the founder already has health issues before his year of death, they do not seem to
a↵ect firm performance. When comparing firm performance measures in the year before
founder death, we can again use the pseudo-R2 of a regression of the treatment dummy on
firm performance measures as indicators of di↵erences between treated and control firms.18
The pseudo-R2 from a regression of the treatment dummy on these performance measures
is 0.007, an indication that treated firms and controls do not di↵er in their performance
in the year before founder death. In fact, when looking at t-tests for di↵erences in means
between treated firms and matched controls for each and every performance variable, we
where i1M and i0M refer to the matched treated and control units.
18We use the same firm performance measures that we use later on in our main analysis: firm survival,
(log) sales, (log) assets, (log) number of employees, and operating return on assets.
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find no significant di↵erences in the year before founder death. All t-statistics are below
1.5. We take this as clear evidence that treated and control founders/firms are not only
comparable at firm foundation (see the results from propensity score estimation discussed
above), but that matched pairs of treated firms and controls founded in the same year
also develop similarly until the year right before founder death.
Our main focus from now on is on understanding whether founder death a↵ects firm
performance after founder death. Why do we not just perform a standard regression anal-
ysis using the whole sample? There are two reasons. First, as shown above, treated firms
and controls are not necessarily comparable ex ante, and matching allows us select those
controls that are best matches. Yet, Angrist (1998) shows that matching and regression
analysis using a fully saturated (=interacted) model di↵er only in the (implicit) weighting
attached to treatment e↵ects within cells defined by combinations of X characteristics.
So, matching is not fundamentally di↵erent from a fully saturated OLS model and this is
not the main reason for using matching. In fact, in Table A.1, we also present OLS re-
sults, for comparison. Second, and most importantly, for control observations, the year of
founder death is not defined. Matching is key to finding comparable controls who started
business in the same year as individual observations of treated firms. We then use year
of founder death at treated firms to impute the counterfactual year of founder death of
the matched control.19 Based on this, we can define ’before’ and ’after’ founder death
for both treated firms and matched controls. Our estimation sample consists of the 205
treated firms and 205 matched controls.
We start by looking at basic di↵erences-in-di↵erences panel regression with firm fixed
e↵ects, where we compare treated and matched controls to assess how firm performance
19The analysis described above, where we looked into the comparison of treated firms and controls
in the year before founder death, is based on the actual (for the treated firms) and imputed (for the
controls) year of founder death.
20
is a↵ected by founder death:
Performanceit = ↵i +  1 ⇤ afterit ⇤ treatedi +  2 ⇤ afterit +   ⇤Xit +  t + ✏ (1)
 1 is our main coe cient of interest, measuring the di↵erence between treated firms and
control firms after founder death.20 We routinely control for all variables that entered the
original matching procedure, i.e., founder and firm characteristics pertaining to the year
in which the firm started operations, as well as year dummies. Adding control variables
adjusts for any small residual bias and increases e ciency. This ‘bias-corrected’ matching
has been found in Abadie and Imbens (2006) to work well in practice.
Later, we extend this analysis in various ways. First, we look in more detail at how
performance varies in a time window around founder death. This allows us to analyze
the time pattern of founder death e↵ects. It also allows us to analyze whether there are
pre-treatment di↵erences, which could be the case, for example, if illness leads to reduced
founder engagement in the years prior to death. Second, we look into heterogeneity of
the treatment e↵ect by founder and firm characteristics. The idea is that, for instance,
founder death may be more detrimental for young firms than for mature firms, and for
smaller firms. Or the death of a highly educated founder might be a bigger loss to the
firm than the death of a less educated founder.
We approach these questions by introducing interaction terms between the treatment
dummies and certain characteristics, like firm age at founder death. Likewise, we interact
the before/after dummies and the di↵erence-in-di↵erences parameter  1 with indicators
of founder or firm characteristics. This informs us whether treatment a↵ects some firms
more than others, i.e., whether there is heterogeneity in treatment e↵ects. Third, we look
20Note that, in the basic di↵erences-in-di↵erences regressions, we exclude the year of founder death
from the regressions because it cannot be clearly assigned to either before or after founder death. Later
on, we take the analysis one step further and estimate separate treatment e↵ects for each year, including
the year of founder death.
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into quantile regressions to see whether the results are driven by things that happen at
the lower, middle or upper end of the conditional performance distribution. We turn to
these issues below.
Startup performance can be measured by survival, growth, and profitability. We
analyze how entrepreneur death a↵ects all these aspects of firm performance. Survival is
assessed by whether a firm is active in given year or not.21 To assess growth, we examine
the e↵ect of entrepreneur death on sales, on human assets as measured by employment,
and on the (book) value of physical assets. For a firm that closes down, we set the relevant
variables equal to zero to measure the e↵ect on sales, employment and assets.22 To assess
profitability, we use operating return on assets (OROA). OROA is defined as the ratio of
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to the total asset base used to generate them,
and is the standard performance measure in a large accounting and financial economics
literature (see e.g., Bennedsen et al. 2007 and references therein).23 Firms that cease
to exist have zero earnings, zero employees, and zero assets (see above), while OROA
is undefined. We impute OROA equal to zero for these observa tions. In an alternative
specification, we impute an OROA that is ‘unreasonably’ high, equal to the average OROA
in our data (about 6.1 percent). Under this alternative imputation, we obtain no e↵ects
on OROA at the mean but obtain very similar results in the quantile regressions.
21A firm is not active if it (a) has gone bankrupt, (b) closed down for other reasons, (c) has less than
NOK 50,000 in sales.
22One might be tempted to exclude firm-year observations after firm closure, but that would introduce
a bias. An example illustrates this point: if founder death has a devastating e↵ect so that only one firm
survives, the one with highest quality among these firms, our regression estimates for firm growth would
be positive.
23Unlike returns to equity or returns to capital employed, OROA compares firm profitability relative
to total assets. In contrast to net income-based measures such as return on assets, OROA is not a↵ected
by capital structure or dividend policy di↵erences across firms. The asset base we use to compute yearly
OROA is the average of assets at the beginning and the end of the calendar year. To prevent outliers
from driving our results, we winsorize the yearly profits and OROA values at the 5% level.
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5 Do entrepreneurs matter?
5.1 Basic results
Table 3, Panel A, presents the results from the di↵erence-in-di↵erence estimation described
in Section IV. We consider a window from five years before to five years after founder
death. Appendix Figure A.1 shows that the number of observations outside this time
window rapidly declines. Including all years slightly strengthens the results. The second
row reports the estimated  1 coe cient for the outcome variables.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
The results presented in Panel A of Table 3 show that entrepreneurs have significant
e↵ects on firm survival and growth. The e↵ects, especially for firm growth, are large; for
example, the mean e↵ects on sales are about 51 percent, while the mean asset e↵ects are
about 59 percent.24
The main reason for the negative e↵ects on firm performance documented in Panel A
could be turbulence created by entrepreneur death. If turbulence drives the results, we
would expect entrepreneur death to have a large short-run e↵ect on firm performance, and
a partial or full reversal over time (for example, finding a substitute for the entrepreneur
could be easier in the longer than in the shorter run). On the other hand, if the en-
trepreneur is a critical resource for the firm, in the sense outlined in Section II, we would
expect the negative performance e↵ects to be long-lasting. To examine this question, in
Panel B of Table 3 we estimate separately the e↵ect 1-2 years after founder death, and
3-5 years after founder death. The sample size is larger than in Panel A because we
also include the year of founder death. The fourth and fifth rows of Panel B show that
compared to the control group, the performance for the treatment group of firms, if any-
24Remember that with log dependent variables, coe cients on dummy variables need to be transformed
as exp( coe cient )  1 to yield percentage e↵ects.
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thing, deteriorates over time; for firm survival, the e↵ect is about 13 percentage points
1-2 years after founder death, and 14 percentage points 3-5 years after founder death.
Also for sales and assets the negative e↵ects are sustained. It is clear that entrepreneur
death leads to large and sustained negative e↵ects on firm performance and that there is
no bounce-back.The following figure plots the estimated di↵erence between treated firms
and control firms across all years of event time, summarizing the regression results.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
The graphs illustrate that over time, the di↵erence between the control and treated
group is accentuated. We interpret this as evidence supporting the notion that the en-
trepreneur is a critical asset that is not easily substituted even in the longer run.
For comparison, we also perform the analysis using OLS on all 16,127 firms in the
database.25 The estimated coe cients, reported in Appendix Table A.1 are of similar
magnitude to that in the matching analysis. In Appendix Table A.3 we run the same
analysis as in Table 3, but without firm fixed e↵ects. The results are similar.
It is it is possible that the large e↵ect on assets reflect voluntary sale of assets to save on
operating costs and improve the firm’s financial position (such asset sales may be part of
the reason for the zero results on profitability). Likewise, the e↵ect on firm survival could
be because of voluntary close-down, or due to forced close-down through bankruptcy. We
have data on whether a firm goes bankrupt prior to 2010. The bankruptcy code in Norway
is similar to Chapter 7 in the U.S. bankruptcy code, i.e., bankruptcy is associated with
creditors taking control and is not voluntary as in Chapter 11 in the U.S bankruptcy code.
In unreported regressions we find that 20 percent of the treated firms and 10 percent of
the matched control firms go bankrupt before 2010 (the di↵erence is significant at the 1
25OLS estimates on the unmatched sample are based on the following regression: Performanceit =
↵+  1 ⇤ afterit ⇤ treatedi +  2 ⇤ treatedi +   ⇤Xit +  t + ✏, where afterit is equal to 1 in the years after
founder death in firms where the founder dies. Note that afterit is set equal to zero in all periods for
firms where the founder does not die.
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percent level). The strong results on bankruptcy suggest that part of the reduction in
assets is due to financial distress and “forced“ sales and not due to voluntary asset sales.
5.2 Are there pre-treatment di↵erences?
We showed in Section IV that there are no di↵erences between control and treated firms
in the year of incorporation. We want to highlight that the results reported in Table 3
also address the important issue whether indeed the post-treatment e↵ect is causal in the
sense that they are the result of an exogenously timed death. Similar to Jones and Olken
(2005), we look at whether there are pre-treatment di↵erences between treated and control
firms. We have done so in the context of the regression estimates presented in Table 3,
illustrated in Figure 1. There is no evidence of any pre-treatment di↵erences between
treated and control firms. The timing of founder death therefore seems to come largely
as a surprise and we interpret di↵erences after founder death as the result of (largely
unexpected) founder death. We discussed above that the finding of no pre-treatment
e↵ects is consistent with the alternative interpretation that even if the founder was ill
before his death, on average that illness does not seem to have a↵ected firm performance.
The lack of pre-treatment di↵erences suggest that matching to a large degree has dealt
with unobserved heterogeneity between the treated and control groups. An alternative
way to show this is to analyze the treatment e↵ects around founder death only for the
treated group. Indeed, Appendix Table A.4 shows that a simple before-after analysis on
the treated group gives very similar results to the di↵erence-in-di↵erence results.
5.3 Quantile e↵ects
Firms that experience entrepreneur death have about 15 percentage points lower survival
rates in the first years after the death event. It is possible that entrepreneur death weeds
out weak firms faster, but there is little e↵ect on higher-quality firms. Or, if the heir or
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creditors voluntarily close down unprofitable firms entrepreneur death could simply mean
a lower threshold for closing down firms than in if the entrepreneur were still alive, rather
than changing the underlying outcome distribution.
To address the important issue of whether entrepreneur death has e↵ects for higher-
quality firms, in Table 4 we look at quantile regressions for the same type of specification
as in Table 3, but where we compare the performance of treated and control firms above
median of the conditional performance distribution. Below the median, there are smaller
di↵erences between treated and control firms, which is largely explained by the fact that
both treated and control firms at the lower quantiles of the distribution are going out of
business.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
There are negative e↵ects of founder death on log(assets) and log(sales) at all deciles
between the median the 90th percentile. At all quantiles, the e↵ects are stronger 3, 4 and 5
years after founder death (not reported). At the 95th percentile (not reported), di↵erences
between treated and control firms seem to disappear. This result has to be taken with
caution because Chernozhukov and Fernandez-Val (2011) suggest that, for data sets of a
sample size like ours, a normal distribution approximation at the 95th percentile might
not be appropriate. We conclude that entrepreneur death appears to have a negative
e↵ect on growth and profitability across the firm performance distribution.
To deal with the issue that there are no treatment e↵ects in the lower quartile due
to attrition of both treated and control firms, an alternative estimation strategy is to
condition on the firm being active the year before founder death. The results of this
regression are reported in Table 5.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
As expected, the results are larger in absolute value compared to the main analysis.26
26As another alternative, we can match on firm and founder characteristics in the year before founder
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5.4 Firm age
Does the importance of the entrepreneur diminish as the firm matures? We analyze
whether the drop in firm performance depends on firm age when the entrepreneur dies.
We split firms into quintiles of firm age upon founder death and interact these quintiles
with the treatment dummy. In order for results to be comparable across quintiles, we
analyze performance e↵ects up to two years after founder death. Table A.6 shows that
there are substantial e↵ects of founder death up to the fourth quintile, which corresponds
to firm age up to seven years upon founder death. For the top quintile, the estimated
coe cients are negative but not significant.
These results suggest that founder death has a very large e↵ect even when the firm
has reached a more mature phase, and that financing constraints and underinvestment of
the type described by Hart and Moore (1994) may be present for a long time in a firm’s
life.
5.5 Firm size
The majority of firms in the database are small, and it would not be surprising that
miniature firms close down if the founder dies.27 We therefore investigate whether the
e↵ect of entrepreneur death depends on startup size. In order to analyze the di↵erential
treatment e↵ect across startup size, we interact the treatment e↵ect with dummies for
quintiles of employment in the year prior to founder death (firms that have not survived
up to this point are excluded from the regressions). In Appendix Figure A.2 we provide
a histogram of firm size in the year prior to founder death.
death, restricting attention to firms that are still active. This strategy has the added benefit of reducing
measurement error since we capture firm characteristics closer to founder death. The results of this
regression are reported in Appendix Table A.5, Panel A. The results are similar to in Table 5.
27For example, many firms in our sample could be vehicles for cutting the tax bill for essentially self-
employed individuals, or firms started up as a ’consumption good’ for the entrepreneur. In both these
cases, it would be no surprise to see the firm to vanish with the founder.
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Table A.7, Panel A, shows that the e↵ects are declining in firm size but still very
substantial in the fourth quintile, which corresponds to between five and eight employees.
For the top quintile, the estimated coe cient is insignificant and positive, which could be
due to the large heterogeneity in this quintile. In Table A.7, Panel B, we split the top
quintile into two deciles. While the estimated coe cient is zero for the ninth decile, it is
positive for the tenth decile.
5.6 Other interactions
In Table 6 we report the results from analyzing the di↵erential e↵ects of a number of
di↵erent types of firms and founders. As we have not found evidence of pre-treatment
e↵ects we again condition on the firm being alive in the year prior to founder death.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
We are interested in whether the entrepreneur is more important in sectors where
human capital is more important relative to physical capital. Our results give some
support to this conjecture. First, we find somewhat stronger e↵ects in sectors where
founder education is above that in the sector with median education, and where sector
wages are above the median across industries. We also find somewhat stronger e↵ects in
sectors with higher R&D expenses, and in sectors where sales growth is above median.
These results, although mostly failing to achieve statistical significance, overall suggest
that founders are relatively more important in human capital intensive firms and sectors.
Among several other dimensions we do not find di↵erences in treatment e↵ects. First,
based on the endogenous growth literature (e.g., Glaeser et al., 1992), we ask whether
the causal e↵ect of individual entrepreneurs is lesser in urban areas, where the supply of
entrepreneurs is denser. In unreported analysis, we find no di↵erence in causal e↵ect of
entrepreneurs in rural and urban areas. This might indicate that, even if there is a larger
supply of (potential) entrepreneurs in a city, there could be mitigating demand-side e↵ects,
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such as the alternative entrepreneurs’ opportunity cost of time being higher. We also split
firms up depending on whether the entrepreneur was the sole owner at the incorporation
date or not. The di↵erences are minor. We also looked at whether founder death matters
less for old founders (60 years or more in the startup year). Such founders might be
less dynamic than younger founders and therefore potentially more easily replaceable.
However, we find no di↵erences in treatment e↵ects by age (not reported). We also looked
at the gender dimension, but find no heterogeneity of the treatment e↵ect by gender (not
reported).
6 Mechanisms
The results of Section V are consistent with a simple mechanism: entrepreneurs personally
embed a major part of the value of firms, and less entrepreneurial engagement harms firm
performance. In this section we discuss this mechanism in further detail. We also discuss
the role of two alternative mechanisms; within-family transfer of control and fragility of
young firms to shocks. In the next section we discuss in more detail whether detrimental
e↵ects of abrupt leadership transition could explain our results.
6.1 Entrepreneurial engagement
To explore the role of entrepreneurial engagement further, we analyze whether the e↵ects
of death depends on whether the entrepreneur works for the firm or not prior to death.
We interact the treatment e↵ect with a dummy for whether the entrepreneur had the firm
as his main employer one year prior to death. The results are reported in Table 6 and
show that the negative e↵ects of founder death are predominantly driven by entrepreneurs
that are employed by their firm prior to death. This result corroborates the idea that
entrepreneur engagement is a critical factor to young firms. Furthermore, it suggests
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that entrepreneurs, in order to be important, need to actively engage in the day-to-day
operations of the firm. In Panel B of Appendix Table A.5, we corroborate the finding
that founder engagement by working in the firm is important, when matching on firm and
founder characteristics in the year before founder death. In Section VII we investigate
entrepreneur engagement further, by utilizing data for 2002 to 2007 on the identity of
chief executive o cers.
6.2 The role of the family
Part of the explanation for the strong e↵ects of founder death could be that post-death,
the control of the firm is transfered to less competent family members.28 Perez-Gonzales
(2006), Bennedsen et al. (2007), and Bertrand et al. (2008) document negative e↵ects on
performance from family CEO appointments inside mature firms.
As a first step, we investigate ownership changes in the aftermath of entrepreneur
death.29 We classify ownership into two categories, the entrepreneur and family members,
and outsiders. Outsiders could be either individuals that are non-family member, or other
firms. In Figure 2 we graph how ownership evolves for these two categories in event time.
We see that even four years after founder death, the family still owns more than half the
company on average. So there is no doubt that the family plays an important role for the
surviving firms.
Our next step is to regress post-death performance on a dummy of whether family
keeps a majority-ownership or not, including death year variables as control. In unre-
ported results, we find firms where the family keeps at least 50% in the first year after
28Alternatively, family members might be subject to inheritance tax, which in turn might force them
to sell o↵ (parts of) the firm. As we discussed in section ??, inheritance tax issues only play a minor role.
29Note that, while data on ownership is complete in the year of firm foundation (which is the basis
for our definition of majority, 50% and minority ownership), ownership data has some missing values in
later years. While this is unfortunate, we do not have reason to believe that it biases the findings below
in a systematic way.
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founder death are more likely to exit in the subsequent years. This could be due to two
reasons (that our data do not allow us to di↵erentiate); either a genuine negative causal
e↵ect of family ownership, or because better-performing firms are easier for the family to
sell o↵. However, conditional on the firm staying active, there are no significant di↵erences
in firm performance between firms where the family does or does not sell o↵.
The second way to approach whether the family hurts the firm is to introduce inter-
action terms between the treatment dummies and a family firm dummy. Likewise, we
interact the before/after dummies and the di↵erence-in-di↵erences parameter  1 with a
family firm dummy. This method is more indirect but gives us causal estimates. It in-
forms us whether treatment a↵ects family firms more than others. We define a family
firm as a firm where at least one of the founding minority owners is a child, parent, sibling
or spouse of the entrepreneur. In the final panel of Table 6, we find evidence that family
firms are more resilient to the death of the founder. Unfortunately the sample of family
firms is small (about 6% of the sample) which limits our ability to get deeper into this
issue.
6.3 Fragility of young firms
Initial owners of start-ups are often family members, friends, former co-workers. Our
results, therefore, may not show a special role of the entrepreneur but rather the fragility
of young firms to circumstances, such as turbulence and emotional distress, created by
death in a close-knit group. If so, one would expect the death of other individuals inside
the circle to have a similar negative e↵ect. We therefore analyze the impact of minority
owner death (an ownership share of at least 10 percent and less than 50 percent, in all 346
death events, see Table A.8 for descriptive statistics) on firm performance using the same
type of matching technology as in the main analysis. The results, analogous to those in
Table 3, are reported in the first panel of Table 7, and show that there are small or zero
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negative e↵ects.30
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
We then analyze the e↵ects of the death of key workers, defined as individuals that
are both employed by the firm and hold an initial minority ownership share. For such
key workers the e↵ect of death, reported in the second panel of Table 7, is statistically
insignificant. This surprising result reinforces the idea that engagement in daily operations
by the entrepreneur is critical; daily engagement even by presumably key workers is of
much less importance.31
To summarize, the results of Section V and VI are consistent with the mechanism out-
lined in Section II: entrepreneurs are a core asset for young firms, and less entrepreneurial
engagement harms firm performance. Other mechanisms, such as within-family transfer
or the fragility of young firms to any shocks do not appear to explain the results. In the
next section we explore whether the negative e↵ects of leadership transition can explain
our results.
7 Leadership transition
Entrepreneurs typically have two roles: they found the company and provide its blueprint,
but typically also manage the firm. It is possible that the results of Section V and Section
VI are not due to entrepreneur specialness, but detrimental e↵ects of abrupt leadership
transition and the costs of adapting to a new leader. In order to deal with this question,
we employ data that provides the end-of-year identity of the firm’s chief executive o cer
(CEO) between 2002 and 2007. We analyze the e↵ects of CEO death, and split the CEOs
30Results (unreported) are very similar when conditioning on the firm being active in the year before
founder death.
31For completeness, the third and the fourth panel of Table 7 reports the results of the same type of
analysis for individuals that own exactly 50 percent of the firm initially (129 death events, for descriptive
statistics see Table A.9).
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into two groups: founders and non-founders, and compare the causal e↵ect of CEOs that
are founders with the causal e↵ect of CEOs that are not founders. We have 142 death
events for CEO-founders (112 for majority owners and 30 for 50% owners) and 114 death
events for CEOs that are non-founders.
The idea behind this analysis is simple: if entrepreneur specialness drives the results,
we would expect the death of CEOs that are entrepreneurs to have a stronger detrimental
e↵ect on the firm than the death of CEOs that are not entrepreneurs. Conversely, if
non-entrepreneur CEO death yields equally strong results, we would conclude that our
results are predominantly due to leadership transition.
In this part of the analysis, we keep the firms where we know the identity of the CEO
in at least one year between 2002 and 2007. As in the main analysis, CEOs that die are
older, and it is not natural to compare firms with CEO deaths to all firms with no CEO
death in our database, but limit the analysis to those firms (and CEOs) in the control
group who are most comparable in terms of observable characteristics. Again we use
propensity score matching to select the firms in the control group who are most similar
to the firms in the treatment group.
We use nearest neighbor matching to select those firms in the control group whose
ex ante probability of experiencing CEO death is closest to that of the firms where the
CEO dies, and our further analysis proceeds on this matched sample. As in the main
analysis, we also present fixed e↵ects results, using all the firms in the database (with the
restriction that we know the CEO identity in at least one year).
As CEO identity can change over time, we perform matching at the firm-year level,
where we find comparable firms in the year before CEO death. For firm characteristics, we
match on year zero characteristics, in order to avoid endogeneity. We require a matched
control to be started up in the same year, and have the same firm age as the treated firm
(this implies that treated and matched control will be measured in the same calendar year).
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We also require exact matching on CEO type, i.e. we match founder-CEOs to founder-
CEOs and non-founder CEOs to non-founder CEOs. In the regressions, we include year,
firm age, and year by sector fixed e↵ects. Table A.10 presents descriptive statistics of
the matched sample. We have also analyzed whether there are di↵erences between the
startups with founder-CEOs to firms with non-founder CEOs. In terms of startup size
there is no di↵erence. The firms with non-founder CEOs are slightly older upon CEO
death than firms with founder-CEOs (mean age 3.2 years versus 2.9 years). Also, the two
types of CEOs are very similar in terms of sociodemographic characteristics such as age
and education level. Thus it seems unlikely that di↵erences in firm characteristics can
explain our results.
Table 8 presents the results for firm survival (Table A.11 shows results for other
firm performance measures). The first three columns are based on the matched sample.
Overall, for all three groups of CEOs, death negatively impacts on firm survival. We
see that the entrepreneur-CEO category yields economically large e↵ects, statistically
significant at the 1% level. The di↵erence to non-entrepreneur CEOs is economically
large and significant at the 7% level. In column 4, we perform the same analysis without
matching, using all the firms in our sample, and using firm fixed e↵ects, as in column 3.
Now the entrepreneur-CEO e↵ect is still large, but the non-entrepreneur CEO e↵ect is
small and statistically insignificant.
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE
In Panel B we investigate the e↵ect for “smaller“ shocks, the death of a person in
the nuclear family (spouse or child). We obtain a matched sample in the same way as
before and descriptive statistics are shown in Panel B of Table A.10. We find overall
smaller e↵ects on firm performance, as expected. Interestingly, the e↵ect is significant
only for CEOs that are entrepreneurs. Thus the finding that CEOs that are entrepreneurs
34
are considerably more important than non-entrepreneur CEOs seems to be a recurring
pattern.
To conclude, we find that the e↵ects of death of CEO-founders are economically and
statistically much stronger than for CEOs that are not founders. We conclude that the
results appear driven by the specialness of the entrepreneur and not leadership transition
of young firms.
8 Conclusion
In the large literature on firm performance, economists have given little attention to the
founders of firms. While the idea of entrepreneurs being important is old, other factors
have been the focus of most empirical work. This paper uses several hundred exogenously
timed deaths as a natural experiment to identify the causal e↵ect of entrepreneurs on
firm performance. We find that entrepreneurs strongly a↵ect performance of both very
young firms and more mature firms, and more strongly in ’dynamic’ industries with higher
education level, larger R&D expenses and higher sales growth. The e↵ects appear to be
driven by entrepreneur specialness rather than leadership transition; the e↵ects of death
of entrepreneur-managers are economically and statistically much stronger than the death
of managers that are not entrepreneurs.
These results point to entrepreneurs playing a large and unique role not previously
documented. Much of the existing evidence in favor of the importance of entrepreneurs is
based on comparing environments with high versus low entrepreneurship rates (e.g., Acs et
al., 2009, Glaeser et al., 2015). However, these findings are open to several interpretations.
A key contribution of our analysis is to directly measure the impact of entrepreneurs, and
to show that it is large even compared to managers.
We highlight one area of possible future research. Our empirical results are much in
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line with the model of entrepreneurship proposed by Hart & Moore (1994). One of the
implications of this model is that founder non-substitutability leads to credit constraints
and suboptimal investment levels. Our empirical results suggests a metric to predict what
type of founders are less substitutable, and therefore less likely to be funded in the first
place. One could use this metric to predict liquidity constraints, and possibly suggest
public policies to alleviate them.
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Figure 1
Treatment e↵ects before and after founder death
Firm survival Log(sales)
Log(assets) Log(employees)
Operating return on assets (OROA)
Note: Figure displays coe cients and standard errors from Table 3, Panel
B. Year 0 refers to year of founder death for treated firms and imputed year
of death for matched firms.
Figure 2
Ownership changes before and after founder death
Share owned by founder & family Share owned by outsiders
Note: The figure plots the ownership shares of (a) founder and family and
(b) “outsiders”, i.e. owners that are neither founder nor family members.
Outsiders could be either individual or corporate owners.
Figure A.1
Number of observations for treated firms before and after founder
death
Note: Graph displays the number of observations for treated firms in a time
window around founder death. Year “0” is the year of founder death.
Figure A.2
Number of employees in the year before founder death.
Matched sample By treatment status
Note: The figure plots the number of employees in the year before founder
death.
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Table A.2: Propensity score estimation
Age .0007
(.0005)
Age squared -7.12e-07
(5.40e-06)
Female -.003
(.001)
Single .002
(.002)
Years of education -.0006
(.0002)
Dummy: Urban area .001
(.001)
Log wealth in year before firm foundation -.001
(.006)
Log wealth in year before firm foundation squared .0002
(.0002)
Log earnings in year before firm foundation .02
(.01)
Log earnings in year before firm foundation squared -.0005
(.0005)
Interaction between log wealth and log earnings -.0003
(.0005)
Self-empl. experience over previous 10 years .001
(.002)
Number of employees .0004
(.0003)
Number of employees squared -.0000107
(9.90e-06)
Log equity at firm foundation -.001
(.001)
Dummy: family firm .0005
(.002)
Ownership share at firm foundation .003
(.007)
Dummy: sole owner at firm foundation -.005
(.003)
Continued on next page
Table A.2: continued from previous page
Agriculture and Fishery .0004
(.005)
Manufacturing -.003
(.003)
Construction -.004
(.003)
Commerce -.004
(.003)
Business Services -.003
(.003)
Other Services -.004
(.003)
Transport, storage and communication -.0006
(.004)
Firm started in 2000 .0005
(.003)
Firm started in 2001 -.002
(.002)
Firm started in 2002 -.003
(.002)
Firm started in 2003 -.003
(.002)
Firm started in 2004 -.005
(.002)
Firm started in 2005 -.007
(.001)
Firm started in 2006 -.007
(.001)
Firm started in 2007 -.008
(.0009)
Obs. 16060
Pseudo-R2 .11
Note: Propensity score estimation underlying
the matched sample in main regression tables.
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